Evaluating the Knowledge and Practice of Limitation of Therapeutic Effort in Health Workers at a Health Care Institution for Cancer Patients in Medellín, 2018Avaliação do conhecimento e da prática da limitação de esforço terapêutico em equipe de atendimento de uma instituição prestadora de serviços de saúde para pacientes oncológicos de Medellín, 2018Limitation of therapeutic effort is any action that involves suspending or not initiating medical treatment or therapeutic measures in patients who will not receive any clinical benefit. In Latin America, (...) some research has proven a lack of familiarization and disagreement with the subject and its practices. The present study tried to objectify the knowledge of LTE of healthcare personnel at an institute in Medellín using a self-administered survey that allowed conducting a cross-sectional descriptive study with non-probabilistic sampling. Within the results, 56.5 % of respondents understood the concept of LTE, and 90 % applied it actively. However, there were discrepancies regarding the core concepts of the definition and practice.Para citar este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigoVallejo LI, Palacio AM, Marulanda V, Restrepo A, Yepes LA, Valencia NL, Cruz MA. Evaluación del conocimiento y práctica de la limitación del esfuerzo terapéutico en personal asistencial de una institución prestadora de servicios de salud para pacientes oncológicos de Medellín, 2018. 2020;24:177-87. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/pebi.2020.24.2.5Recibido: 19/07/2019Aceptado: 08/08/2020Publicado: 27/11/2020. (shrink)

Esta investigación determinó áreas críticas de interés en programas de ingeniería industrial para la incorporación de la gamificación en tres universidades de Colombia desde la percepción de estudiantes y docentes. Se evaluó la actualidad de los programas participantes y sus planes de estudio, lo que permitió identificar temas comunes entre las instituciones de educación mencionadas. Se aplicaron 125 encuestas, 109 a estudiantes (87,2%) y 16 a docentes (12,8%). Los docentes consideran de mayor complejidad temas del área de Investigación de Operaciones, (...) mientras que para los estudiantes corresponde principalmente a Producción. No se encontraron correlaciones significativas entre las tres universidades. (shrink)

Las arquillas de marfil de época califal que se conservan en el Instituto de Valencia de Don Juan y en la iglesia de Santa María de Fitero se labraron para el mismo personaje de la corte de al-akam II, tal y como se evidencia de la dedicatoria escrita con grafía cúfica. Varios especialistas interpretaron el pasaje en cuestión de distintas maneras, siendo las lecturas que acabaron por gozar de mayor crédito la de E. Lévi-Provençal —quien identificó el personaje con (...) Ṣubḥ, concubina de al-Ḥakam II y madre de Hiﬞsām II— y la de J. Ferrandis y E. Kühnel —quienes leyeron en la dedicatoria «para la queridísima Wallāda», aunque sin identificar al personaje.No obstante, el estudio filológico de la inscripción en la base de la interpretación de Manuel Ocaña Jiménez, junto al testimonio de las fuentes históricas confirman la hipótesis de que los objetos suntuarios en realidad se hicieron para la hermana uterina de al-Ḥakam II, Wallāda. (shrink)

El objetivo del estudio es averiguar el grado de conocimientos previos sobre los ODS y la Agenda 2030 de los discentes en formación inicial docente para los Grados de Maestro en Educación Primaria, Maestro en Educación Infantil y Máster en Educación Secundaria de la Universitat de València. Para ello, dentro del marco de un proyecto de Innovación Docente, se administró a los participantes un inventario de conocimientos previos. Finalmente, los resultados fueron analizados y comparados con el objetivo de mejorar futuras (...) intervenciones sobre sostenibilidad e innovación curricular. (shrink)

Adolescent gender-based violence prevention and sexuality education is a topic of current concern given the increasing numbers of violence directed at girls. International organizations indicate that one in three girls aged 15 to 19 have experienced gender-based violence in their sexual relationships that this risk may be as much as 3–4 times higher for girls with disabilities. Following the good results obtained in the research project “Free_Teen_Desire” led by the University of Cambridge and funded by the Marie Curie Actions Program (...) in the prevention of gender violence in adolescents through Dialogic Feminist Gatherings, the aim of study is to analyze Its transfer and impact on adolescent girls with intellectual disabilities. The DFGs are here understood as generators of a more dialogic environment for girls in general and we wonder if and how It is extended to the context of girls with disabilities. Thus, the research takes the form of a case study with a communicative approach on a DFGs. The intervention is carried out in a special school located in Valencia during the 2018–2019 and 2019–2020 academic years with a group of 19 non-mixed female students, female teachers, and the mother of one of the students. The study analyzes which are the transfer criteria to incorporate the DFGs in a special education context and what is their impact on the prevention of gender violence in girls with disabilities. The data collection techniques consist of two in-depth interviews, analysis of the field diary of 24 intervention sessions and a focus group with seven teachers. It is demonstrated that DFGs are successfully transferred to the special education context of the case study. The results show how contexts of safety, solidarity and friendship are generated which protect adolescent girls with disabilities from relationships with gender violence. (shrink)

In September 2008, 10 years after the untimely death of Pere Alberch (1954–1998), the 20th Altenberg Workshop in Theoretical Biology gathered a group of Pere’s students, col- laborators, and colleagues (Figure 1) to celebrate his contribu- tions to the origins of EvoDevo. Hosted by the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research (KLI) outside Vienna, the group met for two days of discussion. The meeting was organized in tandem with a congress held in May 2008 at the Cavanilles Institute (...) for Biodiversity and Evolutionary Biology (ICBiBE) in Valencia, Spain. The talks at the KLI were equal parts: nostalgic remembrance, excitement over new ways of thinking about old problems, and an unrepressed vitriol against the resurgence of reductionist thinking in EvoDevo. Here we highlight some of the key aspects of Pere’s life and work that informed and infused the talks. (shrink)

Dismantling Contemporary Deficit Thinking provides comprehensive critiques and anti-deficit thinking alternatives to this oppressive theory by framing the ...

Este artículo estudia los mecanismos de circulación de intelectuales hispanoamericanos en Colombia durante la segunda mitad del siglo xix. Dicho período evidenció una modernización de la prensa y el mercado del libro en la región, que expandió el espacio de acción de los intelectuales, generando conexiones entre ellos y permitiendo el desarrollo de un debate continental, especialmente alrededor del liberalismo. En particular, el liberalismo colombiano tuvo álgidos debates con el liberalismo chileno. A raíz de los intercambios, se consolidó una comunidad (...) intelectual hispanoamericana. (shrink)

Is democracy a requirement of justice or an instrument for realizing it? The correct answer to this question, I argue, depends on the background circumstances against which democracy is defended. In the presence of thin reasonable disagreement about justice, we should value democracy only instrumentally (if at all); in the presence of thick reasonable disagreement about justice, we should value it also intrinsically, as a necessary demand of justice. Since the latter type of disagreement is pervasive in real-world politics, I (...) conclude that theories of justice designed for our world should be centrally concerned with democracy. (shrink)

In his recent bookThe Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen suggests that political philosophy should move beyond the dominant, Rawls-inspired, methodological paradigm – what Sen calls ‘transcendental institutionalism’ – towards a more practically oriented approach to justice: ‘realization-focused comparison’. In this article, I argue that Sen's call for a paradigm shift in thinking about justice is unwarranted. I show that his criticisms of the Rawlsian approach are either based on misunderstandings, or correct but of little consequence, and conclude that the Rawlsian (...) approach already delivers much of what Sen himself wants from a theory of justice. (shrink)

A globalized world, some argue, needs a global democracy. But there is considerable disagreement about whether global democracy is an ideal worth pursuing. One of the main grounds for scepticism is captured by the slogan: “No global demos, no global democracy.” The fact that a key precondition of democracy—a demos—is absent at the global level, some argue, speaks against the pursuit of global democracy. The paper discusses four interpretations of the skeptical slogan—each based on a specific account of the notion (...) of “the demos”—and concludes that none of them establishes that the global democratic ideal must be abandoned. In so doing, the paper (i) systematizes different types of objections against global democracy, thus bringing some clarity to an otherwise intricate debate and (ii) offers a robust but qualified defense of the global democratic ideal. (shrink)

This article provides a conceptual map of the debate on ideal and non‐ideal theory. It argues that this debate encompasses a number of different questions, which have not been kept sufficiently separate in the literature. In particular, the article distinguishes between the following three interpretations of the ‘ideal vs. non‐ideal theory’ contrast: (i) full compliance vs. partial compliance theory; (ii) utopian vs. realistic theory; (iii) end‐state vs. transitional theory. The article advances critical reflections on each of these sub‐debates, and highlights (...) areas for future research in the field. (shrink)

Within this essay, I seek to understand how the patriarchy impacts the concept of body memory and creates gendered bodily behaviors. I first explain and define the relationship between one’s incorporative memory and affective framing. Given this relationship, I explore what male validation is and how it becomes embodied. I argue that the formation of the incorporative memory and affective framing under the patriarchy creates an embodied experience of male validation. As women begin to understand gender roles, they shift how (...) they move their bodies, and continue to display this gendered movement because men validate it. (shrink)

In this article I present a disagreement between classical and constructive approaches to predicativity regarding the predicative status of so-called generalised inductive definitions. I begin by offering some motivation for an enquiry in the predicative foundations of constructive mathematics, by looking at contemporary work at the intersection between mathematics and computer science. I then review the background notions and spell out the above-mentioned disagreement between classical and constructive approaches to predicativity. Finally, I look at possible ways of defending the constructive (...) predicativity of inductive definitions. (shrink)

In this article, Laura Quintana elaborates on a conceptual distinction between violence and rage. Along with this distinction, she recognises that while rage may possess a destructive potential, it can also be politicised in emancipatory practices that confront conditions of injustice and structural violence. Her analysis centers on contemporary political movements in Latin America, which she views as collective manifestations of rage. Within these movements, the manifestation of rage is intertwined with forms of care and communal labor. Quintana characterises (...) such movements as embodying a “dignified rage” (digna rabia) that calls for an emancipatory transformation of the status quo. She contends that these practices can be understood in terms of the notion of “anti-violence,” as it has been coined by Étienne Balibar. In this she diverges from Judith Butler, since, according to Quintana’s analysis, such practices challenge the demand for non-violence that has often served to neutralise the disruptive force of such manifestations and movements. (shrink)

In this article I argue that characterizations of anger as a hostile emotion may be mistaken. My project is empirically informed and is partly descriptive, partly diagnostic. It is descriptive in that I am concerned with what anger is, and how it tends to manifest, rather than with what anger should be or how moral anger is manifested. The orthodox view on anger takes it to be, descriptively, an emotion that aims for retribution. This view fits well with anger being (...) a hostile emotion, as retribution is punitive. I will argue that a different view of anger deserves our attention. On this alternative view, anger aims for recognition of harms done, rather than for the punishment of those who have committed them. I argue that we have reason to favour a strong view that excludes retribution from anger’s main aims. In addition, I offer a diagnosis of the reasons that led the retributive view of anger to become, and remain, orthodoxy. This diagnosis provides indirect reason to give my descriptive proposal serious consideration, for it highlights that the orthodox view has dominated folk and philosophical conceptions of anger for reasons that do not speak in favour of the view’s veracity. The view that anger is a hostile emotion will therefore emerge as in need of serious scrutiny. (shrink)

Frank Jackson often writes as if his descriptivist account of public language meanings were just plain common sense. How else are we to explain how different speakers manage to communicate using a public language? And how else can we explain how individuals arrive at confident judgments about the reference of their words in hypothetical scenarios? Our aim in this paper is to show just how controversial the psychological assumptions behind in Jackson’s semantic theory really are. First, we explain how Jackson’s (...) theory goes well beyond the commonsense platitudes he cites in its defence. Second, we sketch an alternative explanation of those platitudes, the jazz model of meaning, which we argue is more psychologically realistic. We conclude that the psychological picture presupposed by Jackson’s semantic theory stands in need of a much more substantial defence than he has so far offered. (shrink)

Much contemporary political philosophy claims to be Kant-inspired, but its aims and method differ from Kant's own. In his recent book, Force and Freedom, Arthur Ripstein advocates a more orthodox Kantian outlook, presenting it as superior to dominant (Kant-inspired) views. The most striking feature of this outlook is its attempt to ground the whole of political morality in one right: the right to freedom, understood as the right to be independent of others’ choices. Is Ripstein's Kantian project successful? In this (...) research note I argue that it is not. First, I suggest that Ripstein's notion of freedom is viciously circular. It is meant to ground all rights, but in fact it presupposes an account of those rights. Second, I show that—independently of its inability to ground a whole political morality—such a moralized understanding of freedom is normatively unappealing. (shrink)

In this article, I sketch a Kant-inspired liberal account of human rights: the freedom-centred view. This account conceptualizes human rights as entitlements that any political authority—any state in the first instance—must secure to qualify as a guarantor of its subjects' innate right to freedom. On this picture, when a state (or state-like institution) protects human rights, it reasonably qualifies as a moral agent to be treated with respect. By contrast, when a state (or state-like institution) fails to protect human rights, (...) it loses its moral status and becomes liable to both internal and external interference. I argue that this account not only steers a middle course between so-called natural-law and political approaches to human rights but also satisfies three important theoretical desiderata— explanatory power, functional specificity, and critical capacity. (shrink)

Reference to the state is ubiquitous in debates about global justice. Some authors see the state as central to the justification of principles of justice, and thereby reject their extension to the international realm. Others emphasize its role in the implementation of those principles. This chapter scrutinizes the variety of ways in which the state figures in the global-justice debate. Our discussion suggests that, although the state should have a prominent role in theorizing about global justice, contrary to what is (...) commonly thought, acknowledging this role does not lead to anti-cosmopolitan conclusions, but to the defense of an “intermediate” position about global justice. From a justificatory perspective, we argue, the state remains a key locus for the application of egalitarian principles of justice, but is not the only one. From the perspective of implementation, we suggest that state institutions are increasingly fragile in a heavily interdependent world, and need to be supplemented—though not supplanted—with supranational authorities. (shrink)

Predicativity is a notable example of fruitful interaction between philosophy and mathematical logic. It originated at the beginning of the 20th century from methodological and philosophical reflections on a changing concept of set. A clarification of this notion has prompted the development of fundamental new technical instruments, from Russell's type theory to an important chapter in proof theory, which saw the decisive involvement of Kreisel, Feferman and Schütte. The technical outcomes of predica-tivity have since taken a life of their own, (...) but have also produced a deeper understanding of the notion of predicativity, therefore witnessing the " light logic throws on problems in the foundations of mathematics. " (Feferman 1998, p. vii) Predicativity has been at the center of a considerable part of Feferman's work: over the years he has explored alternative ways of explicating and analyzing this notion and has shown that predicative mathematics extends much further than expected within ordinary mathematics. The aim of this note is to outline the principal features of predicativity, from its original motivations at the start of the past century to its logical analysis in the 1950-60's. The hope is to convey why predicativity is a fascinating subject, which has attracted Feferman's attention over the years. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the relevance that emotions can play in our epistemic life considering the state of the art of the philosophical debate on emotions. The strategy is the one of focusing on the three main models on emotions as evaluative judgements, bodily feelings, and perceptions, following the fil rouge of emotion intentionality for rising questions about their epistemic functions. From this examination, a major challenge to mainstream epistemology arises, the one that asks to provide (...) prominence to the epistemic agent and to her affects. This chapter discusses these implications, also providing an overview of the many alternatives available nowadays in epistemology, arguing for an open, comprehensive, and interdisciplinary approach to emotions in knowledge. (shrink)

Recent work at the junction of epistemology and political theory focuses on the notion of epistemic injustice, the injustice of being wronged as a knower. Miranda Fricker (2007) identifies two kinds of epistemic injustice. I focus here on hermeneutical injustice in an attempt to identify a difficulty for Fricker's account. In particular, I consider the significance of background social conditions and suggest that an epistemic injustice should not rely on other forms of disadvantage to achieve its status as an injustice. (...) Thus reformulated, the notion of epistemic injustice can help us to achieve an even deeper understanding of the relationship between knowledge and privilege. (shrink)

A life without liberty and material resources is not a good life. Equally, a life devoid of meaningful social relationships—such as friendships, family attachments, and romances—is not a good life. From this it is tempting to conclude that just as individuals have rights to liberty and material resources, they also have rights to access meaningful social relationships. I argue that this conclusion can be defended only in a narrow set of cases. ‘Pure’ social relationship deprivation—that is, deprivation that is not (...) caused, or accompanied, by deficits in liberties and material resources— mostly generates demands of private beneficence. I suggest that social relationship deprivation is unjust, hence a rights violation, only when it is due to factors—such as one’s race—that are irrelevant to one’s being a good participant in social relationships. I thus conclude that access to meaningful social relationships is not a fundamental concern for theories of justice. (shrink)

Various philosophers authors have argued—on the basis of powerful examples—that we can have compelling moral or practical reasons to believe, even when the evidence suggests otherwise. This paper explores an alternative story, which still aims to respect widely shared intuitions about the motivating examples. Specifically, the paper proposes that what is at stake in these cases is not belief, but rather acceptance—an attitude classically characterized as taking a proposition as a premise in practical deliberation and action. I suggest that acceptance’s (...) theoretical usefulness in the ethics of belief has been hidden by its psychological obscurity. I thus aim to develop an empirically adequate and mechanistically specific psychological profile of acceptance. I characterize acceptance as centrally involving a cognitive gating function, in which we prevent a target belief state from having its characteristic downstream effects on reasoning, cognition, and action, and restructure those downstream processes. I then argue that there is substantial empirical support for the existence of the cognitive mechanisms needed to instantiate this view, coming from the science of emotion regulation. I argue that acceptance involves deploying the same mechanisms used in emotional response modulation to belief states: acceptance is doxastic response modulation. I then propose that having a better understanding of the psychological profile of acceptance leaves us better positioned to appreciate its potential usefulness for making progress on various puzzles within the ethics of belief. (shrink)

Es reconocido desde hace tiempo por la crítica que en su estructura y contenido el libro de los signos comparte cierta semejanza con las secciones iniciales de los tres primeros evangelios. También sus matices teológicos propios han sido resaltados, así como sus fuentes. Este encuentro y diferencia entre el cuarto evangelio y los sinópticos ha divido a los estudiosos respecto al análisis de sus fuentes y sus rasgos teológicos, como lo son el uso de sus fuentes, los relatos de milagros, (...) su escatología y cristología. Este artículo pretende dar una mirada de conjunto a las líneas de investigación más relevantes en estos puntos. (shrink)

Este trabajo describe la vida y escritos de L. Polo hasta 1996. A los 25 años descubrió su método de pensamiento: el abandono del limite mental. Vivió en Madrid, Roma, Granada y Pamplona. Amante de la verdad y de la libertad personal. Entre sus obras más profundas se encuentran las que componen su Curso de teoría del conocimiento y su Antropología trascendental.

When and why do socially constructed norms—including the laws of the land, norms of etiquette, and informal customs—generate moral obligations? I argue that the answer lies in the duty to respect others, specifically to give them what I call “agency respect.” This is the kind of respect that people are owed in light of how they exercise their agency. My central thesis is this: To the extent that (i) existing norms are underpinned by people’s commitments as agents and (ii) they (...) do not conflict with morality, they place moral demands on us on agency-respect grounds. This view of the moral force of socially constructed norms, I suggest, is superior to views that deny the moral force of such norms, and it elegantly explains certain instances of wrongdoing that would otherwise remain unaccounted for. (shrink)

Doxastic involuntarism—the thesis that we lack direct voluntary control (in response to non-evidential reasons) over our belief states—is often touted as philosophical orthodoxy. I here offer a novel defense of doxastic voluntarism, centered around three key moves. First, I point out that belief has two central functional roles, but that discussions of voluntarism have largely ignored questions of control over belief's guidance function. Second, I propose that we can learn much about doxastic control by looking to cognitive scientific research on (...) control over other relevantly similar mental states. I draw on a mechanistic account of control of the guidance function for “emotion-type states,” and argue that these same cognitive control mechanisms can used to block doxastic guidance. This gives us an account of “back-end” doxastic control which can be deployed for reasons which are not the right kinds of reasons to support “front-end” belief formation—i.e., non-evidential reasons. Third, I argue that comprehensive, self-directed exercises of this kind of control can amount to an underappreciated kind of voluntarism. This form of voluntarism is available to any account of belief that takes guidance-instantiation to be at least partly constitutive of believing. Finally, I discuss objections to, and upshots of, the view. (shrink)

In this article, I develop a new account of the liberal view that principles of justice are meant to justify state coercion, and consider its implications for the question of global socioeconomic justice. Although contemporary proponents of this view deny that principles of socioeconomic justice apply globally, on my newly developed account this conclusion is mistaken. I distinguish between two types of coercion, systemic and interactional, and argue that a plausible theory of global justice should contain principles justifying both. The (...) justification of interactional coercion requires principles regulating interstate interference; that of systemic coercion requires principles of global socioeconomic justice. I argue that the proposed view not only helps us make progress in the debate on global justice, but also offers an independently compelling and systematic account of the function and conditions of applicability of justice. -/-. (shrink)